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Abstract
This essay compares statistical indicators of black/white racial inequality in Brazil
and the United States from 1990 to 2010. Those indicators include racial differen-
ces in fertility, life expectancy, infant mortality, regional distribution, educational
enrollment and achievement, labor force distribution, income and earnings, and
poverty. From 1994 to 2010, Brazilians elected a series of presidential administra-
tions committed to reducing the country’s very high levels of class and regional
inequality. The programs enacted by those governments did reduce poverty and
inequality and enabled some 30 million Brazilians to move from the poor and
working class into a greatly expanded middle class. The article finds that policies
intended to combat class inequality worked to reduce racial inequality as well. On
most indicators, Brazil made greater progress in lowering racial disparities during
those twenty years than did the United States. By 2010 the United States was still
the more racially egalitarian country, in statistical terms; but Brazil’s experiments
in social democracy and in class- and race-based affirmative action are producing
outcomes that merit close attention from citizens and policymakers interested in
reducing class and racial inequality in the United States.
Over the last one hundred years, observers of race in Brazil and the United States
have drawn frequent comparisons between the two countries. The two largest
multiracial societies in the Americas, both nations had intensive experiences first
with African slavery and then, in the 1900s, with the challenges posed by deeply
entrenched racial inequality and exclusion. In thinking about those challenges,
writers and intellectuals in each country have paid attention to the other and
sought insights in cross-national comparisons.1
One of the recurring questions in that comparison has been, which country
has offered greater equality of conditions, opportunities, and outcomes to its
black, brown, and white citizens? Proponents of Brazilian racial democracy—the
belief that Brazil was, or was well advanced toward becoming, a society character-
ized by high levels of racial harmony and equality—argued that Brazil ranked well
ahead of the United States on that score. But beginning in the 1950s and 1960s,
and even more conclusively in the 1970s and 1980s, critics of racial democracy
used Brazilian census and national household survey data to demonstrate wide
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racial disparities in income, vocational achievement, education, life expectancy,
and other social indicators.2
Seeking to contribute to that comparative discussion, some twenty years ago
I published in this journal an analysis of statistical indicators of racial inequality
in both countries. The period covered was the hundred years between 1890 and
1990, and the indicators measured black/white differences in life expectancy, edu-
cation, earnings, vocational achievement—almost any dimension of social or eco-
nomic life for which racial data were available in the two countries.3
The article’s main finding was that during the first 60–70 years of the com-
parison, from 1890 through the 1950s, on most indicators for which statistical
data were available, Brazil displayed lower levels of black-white inequality than
the United States. During the second half of the century, however, the compari-
son shifted. While in Brazil measures of racial inequality tended to remain stable
or in some cases increased, in the United States measures of black/white racial dif-
ference in education, earnings, life expectancy, etc., tended to fall. I posited
several explanations for that decline: the ending of state-imposed segregation in
the South; equal-opportunity and affirmative-action policies enacted during the
1960s and 1970s; and a period of strong economic growth (1945–1973) in which
wealth was more equally distributed, in class terms, than during the first half of
the century. Each of these factors contributed to reductions in black-white differ-
ences, with the result that by 1990 the United States had displaced Brazil as the
more racially equal, at least in statistical terms, of the two countries.
That article predicted that for the foreseeable future the United States was
likely to remain the more racially equal of the two countries. It did, however, offer
one caveat.
A contrarian view would note that Brazil has yet to experience the positive
effects of reductions in regional, class, and urban/rural inequality. Should future
governments succeed in reducing some of the severe disparities between
Northeast and Southeast, between city and countryside, between rich and poor,
the indirect impacts on racial inequality would be substantial. And should future
governments undertake as well to confront racial discrimination in employment
and education, Brazil would almost certainly resume its pre-1950 position as the
more racially equal—or perhaps better put, the less unequal—of the two soci-
eties.4
Those lines were written more in the spirit of a thought experiment, as a
hypothetical counter-factual, than as a serious prediction of Brazil’s future. And
yet, something very close to that imagined scenario actually came to pass. From
1995 to the present, Brazil has been governed by a succession of presidential
administrations—Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva (2003–10), Dilma Rousseff (2011- )—and multi-party coalitions firmly
committed to a social-democratic vision of the country’s future. Those govern-
ments have enacted a series of policy initiatives that have had remarkable impacts
on the country’s longstanding structures of social inequality and privilege.5
The last twenty years thus offer an unusual opportunity to test the effects of
socially progressive policies on racial inequality. This is a question of more than
purely theoretical importance. After a century or more of resolutely ignoring the
yawning disparities separating white and non-white racial groups in the region,
during the last two decades Latin American societies and policymakers have
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begun to acknowledge the depth of those disparities and to discuss how best to
address them. Black movements in Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and other countries
have argued vigorously the need for race-based affirmative action in education
and hiring.6 Their proposals have triggered lively debates, with opponents of affir-
mative action arguing that social-democratic (or socialist) policies aimed at redis-
tributing wealth and opportunity to the poor and working classes are the most
effective means to combat racial inequality.7 Support for their position can be
found in the experience of post-revolutionary Cuba, where between 1960 and
1980 socialist policies in health, housing, education, and employment aimed at
benefiting the country’s rural and urban workers did indeed come very close to
eliminating black/white racial differentials in life expectancy, education and
vocational achievement.8 On the other hand, counter-evidence is provided by
Uruguay, the earliest and most extensive case of social provision in Latin America
and one of two Latin American democracies—Costa Rica is the other—with the
lowest measures of class inequality in the region. However, despite relatively high
levels of class equality, on every social indicator—health, education, earnings,
employment—Afro-Uruguayans suffer major disadvantages in comparison with
their white compatriots.9
What, then, have been the consequences for Afro-Brazilians of recent social-
democratic policy in Brazil? And, to revisit the comparative dimension of my
1992 study, how do Brazil’s current racial indicators compare to those in the
United States? During the same period in which Brazil embraced social democ-
racy, the United States implemented social and economic policies that redistrib-
uted wealth and income upwards, toward the most privileged social groups. If
socially progressive policies tend to reduce measures of racial inequality, do
socially regressive policies have the opposite effect? Comparing recent racial indi-
cators for the two countries can throw light on this intriguing and important
question.
Recent Social Policy
Perhaps the principal economic and social challenge facing Brazilian policy
makers at the beginning of the 1990s was the hyper-inflation that had scourged
the Brazilian economy since the 1950s. Inflation rates approaching 100 percent
per year had been one of the motives for the fall of the Second Republic and the
military seizure of power in 1964; but the military regime of 1964–85 proved no
more effective than the civilians at taming inflation, which topped 200 percent
in 1984 and continued to accelerate into the 1990s. After the annual inflation
rate reached 2500 percent in 1993, the government implemented the innovative
and extraordinarily successful Real Plan of 1994. Inflation fell to 22 percent in
1995 and 2 percent in 1998.10 This benefited the entire society but especially
poor and working-class Brazilians, whose wages now retained their purchasing
power and were no longer rendered worthless by hyper-inflation. The national
poverty rate fell immediately from 42 percent in 1993 to 34 percent in 1995
(figure 1). Real wages increased at all levels of the society but most rapidly of all
among the poorest 10 percent, whose real earnings doubled during that two-year
period.11
Working-class incomes were then further strengthened by increases in the
federally mandated minimum wage. Once the value of the Brazilian currency had
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been stabilized, the Cardoso and Lula administrations implemented substantial
increases in the minimum wage, doubling its real value between 1994 and 2009.
This directly benefited low-wage workers employed in formal-sector enterprises
and exercised upward pressure on informal-sector wages as well.12
Equally consequential for families in the bottom half of the country’s income
distribution were the conditional-cash-transfer and income-maintenance pro-
grams enacted by the Cardoso administration and subsequently expanded by the
Lula administration. These programs were pioneered by the municipal administra-
tions of Campinas and Brasília and offered cash payments to families falling below
the poverty level, conditional on those families ensuring that their children
attended school regularly. Encouraged by the success of those initial experiments,
the Cardoso administration extended them to the nation as a whole, creating
Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, and PETI (Program to Eradicate Child Labor).
In 2003 the Lula administration combined Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentação
into Bolsa Família, which by 2012 was providing assistance to 13.4 million fami-
lies, approximately one-quarter of the country’s total, with payments of up to US
$170 per month. The program has received international attention for its success
in reducing poverty and substantially improving health and education outcomes
for poor children.13
Between 1990 and 2010, Brazil experienced alternating periods of
slow-to-moderate economic growth: 4.8 percent per year during 1993–95, 1.9
Figure 1. Gini Indices and Poverty Rates, Brazil and United States, 1990–2010.
Sources: United States: United States Census Bureau (hereafter USCB), Current
Population Reports, P60–239, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United
States: 2010 (Washington, D.C., 2011), tables A-3, B-1. Brazil: 1990–2009, www.ipeadata.
gov.br; 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (hereafter IBGE), Censo
demográfico 2010: Características da população e dos domicílios (Brasília, 2011), table 1.8.16.
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percent during 1996–2003, and 4.5 percent during 2004–10. Growth at these
levels would normally have had very limited impact on reducing poverty or
inequality; yet during those two decades Brazil’s poverty rate fell by half, from 42
percent to 21 percent, and its Gini index of income concentration, which during
the 1970s and 1980s was one of the highest in the world, fell from 61 to 54
(figure 1).14 Most observers concur in assigning the social programs enacted
during those years with a large share of the credit for those declines.15
Declines in Brazilian poverty and inequality stand in marked contrast to
developments in the United States, where poverty rates fell from 13.5 percent in
1990 to 11.3 percent in 2000 before then rebounding to 15.1 percent in 2010.
During those same years the Gini index of income inequality increased from 43 to
47 (having already risen in the 1980s from 40 to 43) (figure 1).16
The causes of rising poverty and inequality in the United States are complex
and have been much discussed. Contributing factors include the restructuring
of the American labor market and declining opportunities for low-skill workers;
the declining power of organized labor; declines in the value of the federally
mandated minimum wage; the relaxation of regulation of the country’s finan-
cial sector; and tax cuts disproportionately benefiting the country’s wealthiest
sectors.17 Whatever the relative weight of those causes, the comparative picture
that emerges is clear: while Brazil was making striking progress in the reduction of
social and economic inequality, the US was standing still or, on the dimension of
income inequality and poverty, losing ground. Which brings us to the central
question of this essay: what have been the impacts of these two models of social
policy and political economy on measures of racial inequality in the two coun-
tries? Has the United States retained its 1990 position as the more racially egali-
tarian of the two countries, or have reductions in class inequality in Brazil
produced comparable reductions in racial inequality? We will consider indicators
in three areas: demography, education, and employment and earnings.
Demography
Before examining those indicators, we must first consider the two countries’
racial composition and the changes in that composition over the last seventy
years (figure 2). In both countries, the white population peaked as a percentage of
the national total in 1940 and has been falling ever since. The United States
remains a majority-white nation but has become increasingly racially diverse. The
greatest growth in non-white groups has been among “some other race” (usually
Hispanics who do not choose to classify themselves as black or white), Asians,
and, since 2000, individuals who claim multiracial (two or more races) status.
Those “other” groups combined now account for 15.0 percent of the US popula-
tion, slightly more than the African-American population (12.6 percent). The
country’s total population as of 2010 was 308.7 million.18
In Brazil, too, the white population has declined (in relative terms) since
1940, to the point where whites now constitute a minority (47.7 percent) of the
national population. (Total population in 2010 was 190.8 million.) In counting
non-whites, Brazilians distinguish between dark-skinned pretos (blacks) and
racially mixed pardos (browns).19 In practice the boundaries between the brown
and black color categories are fairly vague and porous, and research suggests that
brown and black Brazilians cross-identify (i.e., sometimes describe themselves as
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brown, and sometimes as black) in fairly large numbers, producing sizable
population shifts over time.20 During the last twenty years a growing number
of Afro-Brazilians have chosen to identify as preto, perhaps in response to
consciousness-raising efforts by black organizations. The great majority of non-
whites, however, continue to identify themselves (for census purposes; the term is
not commonly used in day-to-day social interaction) as pardo.21
One factor contributing to the permeability of boundaries between the black
and brown groups is that, on most social dimensions, the differences between the
two groups are relatively small. In terms of education, earnings, life expectancy,
etc., brown and black indicators are quite similar. For that reason, and also
because pretos constitute a small proportion—as of 2010, less than 15 percent—of
the Afro-Brazilian population, since the late 1970s the Brazilian census agency,
IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), has often combined the two
groups in its published reports into a single negro (black) category. I will follow
that convention in the following graphs and tables, except in cases in which
there are significant differences between the black and brown groups. In such
instances I will present separate figures for pardos and pretos.
One area in which there is significant difference between the black and
brown racial groups in Brazil is their regional distribution. As indicated in table 1,
pardos and pretos are more likely than whites to live in the Northeast, historically
Figure 2. Racial Composition of Brazil and United States, in Percentages, 1940–2010.
Sources: United States: 1940–1980, Andrews, “Racial Inequality,” table 1; 1990, USBC,
1990 Census of Population: General Population Characteristics, United States (Washington, D.
C., 1992), table 3; 2000, USCB, “Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin” (Washington,
D.C., 2001), table 1; 2010, USCB, “Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin”
(Washington, D.C., 2011), table 1. Brazil: 1940–1980, Andrews, “Racial Inequality,” table
1; 1991, IBGE, Censo demográfico 1991: Características gerais da população e instrução (Rio
de Janeiro, 1996), table 1.2; 2000, IBGE, Censo demográfico 2000: Características gerais da
população (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), table 1.2.1; 2010, IBGE, Censo demográfico 2010, table
1.3.1.
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Table 1. Regional Distribution by Race, in Percentages, Brazil and United States, 1980–2010
Brazil United States
White Pardo Preto White Black
1980 1980
Northeast 14.5 49.6 33.2 South 31.1 52.2
Southeast 53.2 28.3 51.5 Northeast 22.4 18.6
South 24.8 5.0 8.5 Midwest 27.1 20.5
Rest of Brazil 7.5 17.1 6.7 West 19.4 8.6
Index of White/Nonwhite Dissimilarity – 44.7 18.8 Index of White/Nonwhite Dissimilarity – 21.2
2009 2010
Northeast 16.8 40.0 33.1 South 35.9 56.5
Southeast 49.3 32.9 46.8 Northeast 18.4 16.8
South 23.6 5.7 7.6 Midwest 24.3 17.9
Rest of Brazil 10.3 21.5 12.6 West 21.4 8.8
Index of White/Nonwhite Dissimilarity – 34.4 18.6 Index of White/Nonwhite Dissimilarity – 20.6
Sources: United States: 1980, USCB, The Black Population in the United States: March 1988 (Washington, D.C., 1989), table B; 2010, USCB, The Black Population: 2010
(Washington, D.C., 2011), figure 2; USCB, The White Population: 2010 (Washington, D.C., 2011), figure 4. Brazil: 1980, IBGE, Recenseamento geral do Brasil, 1980 (Rio
de Janeiro, 1983), table 1.1; 2009, IBGE, Síntese de indicadores sociais: Uma análise das condições de vida da população brasileira, 2010 (Rio de Janeiro, 2010), table 8.1.
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the country’s poorest region. Conversely, whites are more likely than blacks or
browns to live in the southern states, the country’s most economically dynamic
region. And pardos are less likely than whites or pretos to live in the Southeast and
are more concentrated in the country’s central and western regions (“rest of
Brazil”). The result of these patterns, as summarized by the Index of Dissimilarity,
is that preto regional settlement patterns more closely approximate those of
whites, while pardos are clearly differentiated from both groups (though less so
than in 1980, when white/pardo differences were even greater than they are
today).
Regional settlement patterns differ for blacks and whites in the United States
as well, though less so than in Brazil. As measured by the Index of Dissimilarity,
those differences have remained more or less constant over the last thirty years;
while slightly higher than preto/white differences in Brazil, they are well below
pardo/white differences in regional distribution. Racial differences in regional dis-
tribution are thus greater in Brazil than in the United States; and though regional
differences in earnings, education, and other opportunities have declined in
Brazil in recent years, they remain larger than such differences in the United
States. Differences in racial distribution among Brazil’s regions thus set the stage
for other racial disparities as well.22
As we have seen, Brazil’s white population has declined, as a percentage of
the total population, from 1940 to the present. The principal cause of that
decline is the differential between white and black birthrates (figure 3).
Historically very high for both racial groups, between 1960 and 1980 fertility rates
Figure 3. Total Fertility Rates, Women Age 15–44, by Race, Brazil and United States,
1980–2009. Sources: United States: USCB, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012
(hereafter SAUS 2012) (Washington, D.C., 2011), table 83. Brazil: 1980–2004, Marcelo
Paixão et al., eds., Relatório anual das desigualdades raciais no Brasil, 2009–2010 (Rio de
Janeiro, 2010), figure 3.1; 2009, IBGE, Síntese de indicadores sociais, 2010, table 1.5.
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for white women fell precipitously, from 6.2 children per woman to 3.6. Fertility
fell for black women as well, but not as rapidly as for whites. Declines in fertility
continued through the end of the 1900s and into the early 2000s. By 2009, white
fertility rates had fallen to 1.6 children per woman, well below the level required
to maintain the white population at current levels. Black fertility rates fell to 2.2
children per woman in 2009, and racial differentials fell as well. In 1980, black
women bore on average 1.9 more children over their lifetimes than white women;
by 2009 that differential had fallen to 0.6 children. That differential was still
greater, however, than black/white disparities in the United States, which were
relatively low in the 1980s and 1990s and by 2000 had disappeared. In the first
decade of the 2000s, white and African-American birthrates were essentially the
same, at 2.0–2.1 children per woman. On this indicator, the United States ranks
as the more racially equal of the two societies.23
The comparative picture shifts, however, when we turn to perhaps the most
basic indicator of wellbeing for any population: average life expectancy (table 2).
Here both countries experienced significant improvements over the last twenty
years. In Brazil, life expectancy increased from 66.3 to 73.1; and in the United
States, from 75.2 to 78.2. As table 2 suggests, those increases were distributed in
more racially equitable ways in Brazil than in the United States. Throughout the
1990–2005 period, racial differentials were consistently lower in Brazil than in the
United States; and while those differentials fell in both countries (in table 2, see
the W-B columns), they did so more rapidly in Brazil, where by 2005 racial differ-
entials in life expectancy were less than half what they had been in 1991.24
These improvements in life expectancy, and the reduction of racial disparities
in life expectancy, can be traced directly to the reductions in infant mortality that
took place during the Cardoso-Lula years (figure 4). As a result of the Saúde da
Família and Bolsa Alimentação programs, between 1995 and 2005 infant mortal-
ity for the country as a whole fell from 37.6 per thousand to 23.7 per thousand, a
decline of more than one-third. Reductions in infant mortality were particularly
dramatic among the black population, for whom rates fell by almost half, from
47.3 per thousand to 24.4. White infant mortality fell from 27.1 to 19.4. In 1995,
infant mortality rates had been 75 percent higher among black families than
among white; by 2005, that racial differential had fallen to 25 percent, or in abso-
lute terms a difference of 5.0 deaths per 1000 births. Whether in relative or abso-
lute terms, that racial differential was much lower than its counterpart in the
United States, where black infant mortality rates were two-and-a-half times those
of white rates.25
Education
Education is universally recognized as a fundamentally important area of
social provision and as one of the most powerful determinants of social inequality
and hierarchy. One of the clearest expressions of class and racial inequality in
Brazil has been the country’s low levels of educational achievement. As of 1950,
only 5 percent of white Brazilians, and 0.5 percent of Afro-Brazilians, had grad-
uated from high school.26 The military dictatorship of 1964–85 made education a
priority area of government investment but focused that investment at the univer-
sity level, greatly expanding the system of federal and state universities. Those
institutions offer higher education of good-to-excellent quality but only to a small
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minority of the population; and until quite recently that small minority has been
almost exclusively white. In 1987, after more than twenty years of military rule,
only one percent of pretos and 2 percent of pardos held a college degree, as com-
pared to 9 percent of whites. The average adult white Brazilian received less than
four years of schooling at that time, and the average Afro-Brazilian less than two
years.27
Recognizing the impossibility of entering the twenty-first century with a
national educational profile this low, the Cardoso and Lula administrations
invested heavily to raise levels of academic achievement. While the FUNDEF
Table 2. Life Expectancy by Race, Brazil and United States, 1990–2008
United States Brazil
White Black W-B White Black W-B
1990 76.1 69.1 7.0 1991 66.1 59.5 6.6
1995 76.5 69.6 6.9 1995 71.5 65.9 5.6
2000 77.3 71.8 5.5 2000 71.5 66.2 5.3
2005 77.9 72.8 5.1 2005 74.9 71.7 3.2
2008 78.4 74.3 4.1
Sources: United States: USCB, SAUS 2012, table 104. Brazil: 1991, 2000, www.ipeadata.gov.br; 1995,
2005, Marcelo Paixão and Luiz Carvano, eds., Relatório anual das desigualdades raciais no Brasil, 2007–
2008 (Rio de Janeiro, 2008), figure 2.18.
Figure 4. Infant Mortality Rates, by Race, Brazil and United States, 1990–2007.
Sources: United States: USCB, SAUS 2012, table 115. Brazil: Paixão and Carvano,
Relatório anual, 2007–2008, table 2.8.
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(Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental, 1996–
2006) and FUNDEB (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação
Básica, 2007–) programs channeled federal investment to primary schools, Bolsa
Escola (and later Bolsa Família) provided cash incentives for poor families to keep
their children in school rather than send them out to work.28 Those programs
achieved at least part of their goals, elevating rates of enrollment for children aged
7–14 from 80 percent in 1988 to 95 percent in 2008 and eliminating racial differ-
entials at that level of the educational system (figure 5).
Racial differentials in enrollment were more persistent at the high-school
and college levels; indeed, at both levels racial differentials actually increased
between 1988 and 2008, from 14 percentage points to 19 at the high-school
level, and from five percentage points to 13 at the college level. While racial dif-
ferentials in enrollment were disappearing in elementary and middle school, in
high school and college they were increasing as whites pursued opportunities for
secondary and post-secondary education in larger numbers than Afro-Brazilians.
Enrollment data from the United States show much higher levels of enroll-
ment, and smaller racial differentials, than in Brazil (figure 6). From 1990 to the
present, racial differentials have been very close to 0 through age 17. Racial dis-
parities then increase at the college level and in 2009 were at eight percentage
points for 20–21-year-olds. By that year enrollment for 22–24-year-olds was
actually higher for African-Americans than for white students, reflecting longer
times to completion of college degrees.
Figure 7 compares rates of high school and college completion in the two
countries over time. Each column represents the percentage of adults age 25 and
over who completed high school; the upper-most portion of the column
Figure 5. Percentage Rates of Enrollment in School, by Age and Race, Brazil, 1988–2008.
Source: Paixão et al., Relatório anual, 2009–2010, tables 6.15, 6.16, 6.19.
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represents the number of high-school graduates who continued on to complete a
college degree. In both countries we note substantial improvement over time. In
the United States, black high-school graduation rates rose from 66.2 percent in
1990 to 84.1 percent in 2009, very close to the white graduation rate of 87.1
percent. In Brazil during the same period, black high-school graduation rates
tripled, from less than 10 percent in 1987 (10.0 percent for pardos, 6.1 percent for
pretos) to almost 30 percent in 2009 (28.7 percent for pardos, 29.9 percent for
pretos). Racial differentials remained very high, however, with whites more than
50 percent more likely than Afro-Brazilians to have graduated from high school,
and three times more likely to have graduated from college.
Racial differentials in college graduation remained large in the United States
as well, and unexpectedly consistent over time. While whites and blacks both
increased their rates of college graduation from 1990 to 2009, a racial gap of 10–11
percentage points persisted throughout that period. By 2009, 29.9 percent of whites
were college graduates, as compared to 19.3 percent of African-Americans.29
A final indicator of Brazilian educational achievement is the median number
of years of schooling completed (figure 8). (This measure is not widely used in
the United States.) As indicated earlier, in 1987 that number was less than four
years of schooling for white Brazilians and less than two years for brown and
black Brazilians. Over the next twenty years, absolute levels of educational
achievement improved considerably and racial disparities fell. By 2009, average
years of schooling completed had more than doubled for whites, to 8.4 years, and
more than tripled for Afro-Brazilians, to 6.7 years. This reduced the difference
between black and white educational achievement from 2.1 years in the 1990s to
1.7 years in 2009.
Figure 6. Percentage Rates of Enrollment in School, by Age and Race, United States,
1990–2009. Sources: USCB, SAUS 2002, table 203; USCB, SAUS 2012, table 224.
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Figure 7. Percentage Rates of High School and College Completion, Adults Age 25 and
Over, by Race, Brazil and United States, 1987–2009. Sources: United States: USBC,
SAUS 2011, table 229. Brazil: 1987, Andrews, “Racial Inequality,” table 10; 2000, Fichário
das Desigualdades Raciais, LAESER-UFRJ, http://www.laeser.ie.ufrj.br/PT/Paginas/fichario.
aspx; 2009, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (hereafter PNAD) 2009,
Microdados.
Figure 8. Median Years of Education, Population Age 15 and Over, Brazil, 1992–2009.
Sources: IPEA, Políticas Sociais—Acompanhamento e Análise 20 (2012), supplementary
table 3.1.
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Despite these improvements, by 2009 the average Brazilian was receiving a
junior-high-school education (or less). And these statistics do not reflect other
aspects of racial inequality in Brazilian education: serious disparities in the quality
of schools that blacks and whites attend, in grade-repetition (students not being
approved to enter the next grade and therefore having to repeat the one they are
in), in standardized test scores, and so on.30 And while Brazil has succeeded in
closing racial gaps in enrollment at the elementary and middle-school levels, gaps
in enrollment have widened at the level of high school and college; differentials
in high-school and college graduation rates have fallen but remain large.
Racial differentials in the quality of schools attended, grade repetition, test
scores, and college graduation rates persist in the United States as well but at
lower levels than in Brazil.31 While neither country has been able to fully resolve
longstanding racial differentials in educational achievement, as of 2010 the
United States was providing much higher levels of education to its citizens than
was Brazil and was doing so in a more racially egalitarian way.
Employment and Earnings
Given the larger racial disparities in education in Brazil (than in the United
States), we would expect to find greater racial differences in earnings in that
country, and indeed that is the case. Further contributing to racial disparities in
earnings are differences in the labor markets of the two countries. One of the find-
ings of my 1992 article was that between 1950 and 1980 the United States made
striking progress in equalizing the distribution of blacks and whites across different
sectors of the economy. Between 1950 and 1980, the index of occupational dis-
similarity between the black and white populations fell by almost half, from 30.1
to 16.3.32 That progress continued between 1980 and 2009, as the index of occu-
pational dissimilarity again fell by almost half, from 16.3 to 8.7 (table 3, column 4).
During those same years, racial differentials in the labor market fell in Brazil
as well, but not to the same degree as in the United States (table 4). Especially for
pardos, racial differentials (as measured by the index of dissimilarity) in 2009 were
not greatly improved from those in 1980. Pretos made greater progress, and espe-
cially preta women. But racial disparities remained quite high, approximately
double those in the United States.
Because of those disparities in employment patterns, and white Brazilians’
greater access to more highly-paid employment in professional/technical and ad-
ministrative positions, Afro-Brazilian earnings lagged well behind those of white
Brazilians. However, government-mandated increases in the minimum wage,
combined with relatively strong economic growth between 2004 and 2010, did
produce significant increases in Afro-Brazilian earnings, and indeed greater
increases than in white incomes (figure 9). While in 1991 Afro-Brazilian workers
earned on average 54 percent of white median earnings, by 2010 that proportion
had increased to 64 percent. Meanwhile, while median African-American earn-
ings did and do represent a higher proportion of median white earnings than in
Brazil, that proportion remained essentially unchanged during the two decades
between 1990 and 2010. At the beginning of that period, and at the end,
African-American males earned on average 74 percent of white male earnings,
and African-American females earned on average 87 percent of white female
earnings (figure 9). During a period in which Afro-Brazilian wage-earners made
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measurable progress in relation to their white counterparts, African-Americans’
relative position did not improve.
The story is the same when we look at median household income (figure 10).
Here again African-American households receive on average a higher percentage
of white median income than is the case in Brazil. But that percentage, after
rising from 60 percent in 1990 to 69 percent in 2000, then drifted downward to
finish the decade at 59 percent, slightly lower than in 1990. After making progress
during the 1990s, African-American families lost ground in the early 2000s and
ended the 20-year period slightly worse off, in relation to white families, than in
1990.33
Afro-Brazilian families receive on average an even lower percentage of white
family income than do African-American families. But while African-American
families lost ground during the last decade, Afro-Brazilian households saw their
incomes rise in relation to white incomes. Again, this is partly the result of
increases in the minimum wage, partly the economic growth of 2004–10, and
partly the conditional cash transfer programs that have disproportionately bene-
fited nonwhite families, especially those living in the poorest regions of the
country. Between 1999 and 2009, black median household earnings rose from 42
percent of white household earnings to 52 percent.34
As we have previously seen (figure 1), Brazil’s social and economic policies
produced dramatic declines in the country’s poverty rates, cutting them in half
(from 42 percent to 21 percent) between 1990 and 2009. Rates of poverty in the
Table 3. Percentage Distribution, Civilian Labor Force by Race and Sex, United States,
1980, 2010
White Black
Total Male Female Total Male Female
1980
Administrative 27.9 19.6 39.9 22.3 14.6 30.4
Professional/ technical 15.5 14.1 17.6 11.2 7.6 15.0
Sales 10.5 9.5 11.9 5.0 3.9 6.2
Non-agricultural manual 31.7 44.3 13.7 37.1 53.9 19.5
Service 11.4 8.1 16.1 22.3 16.5 28.3
Agriculture 2.8 4.2 0.9 2.0 3.3 0.6
Other/unknown 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Index of Dissimiliarity - - - 16.3 18.0 18.1
2010
Administrative 28.7 23.2 35.0 25.3 19.7 30.1
Professional/ technical 22.1 17.6 27.3 18.8 13.7 23.1
Sales 11.2 10.7 11.7 10.0 8.4 11.4
Non-agricultural manual 20.7 33.8 5.5 21.2 36.5 6.9
Service 16.6 13.6 20.1 25.1 21.2 28.3
Agriculture 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2
Index of Dissimiliarity - - - 8.7 10.3 9.1
Sources: 1980, Andrews, “Racial Inequality,” table 12; 2010, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics,
“Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2010,” Report 1032 (Washington, D.C., 2011),
table 5.
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Table 4. Percentage Distribution, Civilian Labor Force by Race and Sex, Brazil, 1980, 2009
White Pardo Preto
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
1980
Administrative 16.7 15.3 20.1 6.7 6.1 8.5 4.2 4.3 4.0
Professional/ technical 9.0 5.6 17.3 3.8 1.8 9.6 2.5 1.3 5.1
Sales 9.0 9.0 9.0 6.5 6.3 7.1 4.0 4.2 3.6
Non-agricultural manual 26.0 30.5 14.6 25.6 29.6 13.8 27.9 36.1 10.3
Service 10.7 5.0 24.9 13.0 4.9 37.0 22.6 6.3 57.9
Agriculture 22.7 27.8 9.8 38.6 44.8 20.3 31.5 38.9 15.7
Other/unknown 6.0 6.7 4.2 5.8 6.5 3.8 7.2 8.9 3.4
Index of Dissimilarity – – – 18.3 17.0 22.5 23.9 20.2 38.9
2009
Administrative 18.2 15.5 21.3 10.5 8.6 13.1 11.0 9.3 13.2
Professional/technical 19.1 16.6 22.1 9.9 8.1 12.4 10.3 8.8 12.2
Sales 10.0 8.4 11.9 9.7 7.8 12.3 8.0 6.8 9.5
Non-agricultural manual 22.4 33.3 9.5 24.9 37.1 8.4 26.6 41.4 7.4
Service 17.5 10.4 26.0 23.5 12.8 38.1 30.1 16.8 47.4
Agriculture 12.8 15.8 9.3 21.5 25.7 15.7 14.0 16.9 10.3
Index of Dissimilarity – – – 17.7 16.1 19.5 18.0 15.5 22.5
Sources: 1980: Andrews, “Racial Inequality, ” table 13; 2009: PNAD 2009, Microdados.
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Figure 9. Black Median Earnings as a Percentage of White Median Earnings, by Sex, Brazil
and United States, 1991–2010. Sources: United States: United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics, “Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2010,” Report 1032
(Washington, D.C. 2011), table 14. Brazil: 1991, IBGE, Censo demográfico 1991: Mão de
obra, table 5.1; 2000, IBGE, Censo demográfico 2000, table 1.2.10; 2010, IBGE, Censo
demográfico 2010, table 1.3.5.
Figure 10. Black Median Household Income as a Percentage of White Median Household
Income, Brazil and United States, 1990–2010 Sources: USBC, Income, Poverty, 2010, table
A-2. Brazil: 1990–2007, Sergei Soares, “A trajetória da desigualdade: A evolução da renda
relativa dos negros no Brasil,” in Mário Theodoro, ed., As políticas públicas e a desigualdade racial
no Brasil 120 anos após a abolição (Brasília, 2008), figure 1; 2009, PNAD 2009, Microdados.
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United States, after falling from 1990 to 2000, then rose and by 2010 were higher
than they had been in 1990. Somewhat surprisingly, while black poverty rates
were lower in 2010 (27 percent) than they had been in 1990 (32 percent), among
white families the reverse was true, with poverty rates rising from 11 percent in
1990 to 13 percent in 2010. Even so, black poverty rates in 2010 were twice as
high as white poverty rates, as more than a quarter of the African-American pop-
ulation lived below the poverty line (figure 11).
In Brazil, economic growth and cash-transfer programs benefited both racial
groups: between 1995 and 2009 poverty rates dropped by 20 percentage points
(from 54 percent to 34 percent) among Afro-Brazilians and 11 points among
whites (28 percent to 17 percent). In both years black poverty rates were approxi-
mately double those of whites, and both groups suffered from rates higher than
those in the United States; but as racially differentiated poverty data become
available for the period 2010–12, I suspect that they will show those differentials
continuing to fall in Brazil.
Social Democracy, Racial Democracy
The indicators of racial inequality examined in this essay suggest both the
achievements and the limits of Brazil’s experiment with social democracy. In the
areas of health, education, and earnings, the social and economic policies of the
last twenty years have produced dramatic improvements in wellbeing for most
Brazilians and on a number of indicators—fertility, infant mortality, life expect-
ancy, primary- and middle-school enrollment, median years of schooling, individ-
ual earnings, household income, and poverty—even greater improvements for
Figure 11. Poverty Rates by Race, Brazil and United States, 1990–2010. Sources: United
States: USCB, Income, Poverty, 2010, table B-1. Brazil: 1995–2006, Paixão and Carvano,
Relatório anual, 2007–2008, table 6.7; 2009, special tabulation by LAESER-UFRJ.
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black and brown Brazilians than for whites. Those advances produced visible
reductions in racial disparities, lending support to those who invoke social democ-
racy as the most effective way to achieve racial equality.
Despite those improvements, levels of racial inequality remain higher in
Brazil than in the United States. On only two indicators—infant mortality and
life expectancy—does Brazil currently rank as the more racially equal society. On
one other indicator, poverty rates, the two countries are tied, with black/white
differentials of approximately 2:1. On all other indicators—regional distribution,
academic enrollment, high-school and college graduation rates, occupational dis-
tribution, individual earnings, household income—the United States continues
to show greater evidence of racial equality than does Brazil.
This is in part a reflection of the very large statistical gaps that separated
black, brown, and white Brazilians in 1990 and that will require more than just
twenty years to overcome.35 It is also important to note that while government
social policies did reduce racial disparities in some areas, they left such disparities
largely unchanged in others—occupational distribution—and actually increased
in others—high-school and college enrollment. These somewhat contradictory
results are owing to the complexities of racial hierarchy in Brazil and the different
ways in which racial exclusion operates at different levels of the class structure.
Beginning in the 1970s and 80s and continuing to the present, statistical research
has demonstrated that barriers of discrimination and prejudice operate much
more powerfully among Brazil’s middle and upper classes than among the poor
and working class. Poor whites and Afro-Brazilians are more likely than their
middle- and upper-class counterparts to live in integrated neighborhoods, to go to
school together, to form friendships and romantic relationships, and to marry.
Employment and earnings discrimination is also much less in evidence in
working-class occupations but asserts itself with increasing strength as one moves
up the vocational and educational ladder.36
One of the most striking successes of the social democratic experiment of the
last twenty years has been the movement of some 30 million Brazilians from the
working class to what some observers have described as “the new middle class.”37
As suggested by the data on declining racial differentials in employment and
wages, Afro-Brazilians were fully involved in that process of upward mobility,
taking part in it in numbers comparable to, or even higher than, those of whites.
Within that new middle class, however, sharp racial differentials in income do
persist.38 And it is at those middle-to-upper levels of the social pyramid—profes-
sional and white-collar employment, and high-school and college enrollment—
that our data show stable or even increasing racial differentials.
It is precisely in order to resolve barriers of racial exclusion at those levels,
Afro-Brazilian activists have long argued, that racial affirmative action policies are
necessary. In response to those arguments, the Cardoso administration included
proposals for “compensatory” affirmative action policies as part of its 1996
Human Rights Program. Proposals for racial quotas in university admissions,
public-sector hiring, and print and media advertising were included as part of
Congressman (now Senator) Paulo Paim’s Statute of Racial Equality, first intro-
duced into Congress in 2000. Those proposals were never approved by the
Brazilian Congress but, beginning in 2003, were adopted by over forty federal and
state universities, several government ministries and agencies, and a number of
private firms.39
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That piece-meal adoption of quotas set off intense debates in Brazil over the
concept and practice of affirmative action, and several legal challenges to the con-
stitutionality of racial quotas. In two decisions rendered in April 2012, Brazil’s
Supreme Court decided unanimously that racial set-asides do meet the test of
constitutionality as a necessary means to achieve the equality of conditions and
opportunity guaranteed by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988.40 Several months
later, in August 2012, the Brazilian Senate approved, by a vote of 80–1, the Law
of Social Quotas, which requires the country’s federal universities to reserve
one-half of their entering places for graduates of the country’s public schools.
Within that 50 percent quota, black, brown, and indigenous students must be
included in numbers equivalent to their representation in the local population; at
the same time, 50 percent of the quota students—25 percent of all entering stu-
dents—are required to have per capita family incomes equal to or less than 150
percent of the federally mandated minimum wage. Those quotas are to be phased
in gradually over 2013–17 and their results to be evaluated by a Congressional
commission in 2022.41
With this new legislation and the recent Supreme Court decisions, Brazil is
now fully embarked on an innovative public policy experiment that combines
race- and class-based affirmative action with full-bore social democracy. That
two- (or three-) pronged approach offers the possibility—indeed, the likelihood
—of further advances in the reduction of racial inequality beyond what has been
achieved over the last twenty years. Brazil’s experiment should also prompt some
serious thinking in the United States about our own continuing racial divides and
our national ambivalence concerning both class-based social provision and racial
affirmative action.
The last ten-year period in which the United States saw reductions in
poverty comparable to those that have taken place recently in Brazil was 1964–
1973, when poverty rates fell from 19 percent to 11 percent. This was the period
of the federally mandated War on Poverty, a set of government programs that left
a deeply controversial political legacy but that did succeed in reducing poverty
rates to their lowest levels in American history.42 It was also the period (extending
through the late 1970s) of most intense national commitment to racial affirmative-
action programs, which by 1980 had helped expand the size of the African-
American middle class to some 40 percent of the black population.43
It was those policies, plus the relatively equitable economic growth of the
1945–73 period, that produced the declining racial differentials documented in
my 1992 article.
The reduction of anti-poverty efforts in the 1970s, the backlash against racial
affirmative action in the 1980s and 1990s, declining industrial employment, and
falling real wages for low-skill jobs, all combined to slow the pace of further re-
ductions in racial differentials in the 1990s and early 2000s.44 The rising class
inequality of those years consigned much of the black population, and a growing
proportion of the white population, to the margins of American society, with
severely reduced access to opportunities for education, employment, and advance-
ment.45 Writing in the 1980s and 1990s, sociologist William Julius Wilson pro-
posed the principles and some of the practices of European social democracy as
possible policy responses to the deepening crisis of what he called the American
underclass.46 But might the recent achievements of Brazilian social democracy be
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just as relevant to the conditions and prospects of the United States’ multiracial
poor and to the larger context of rising inequality in American life?
Not all of the recent programs enacted in Brazil are directly applicable or rele-
vant to the United States. At least under current conditions, few American
parents require cash incentives to enroll their children in elementary school or to
seek medical care for them. And levels of poverty and overall inequality were so
high in Brazil in the early 1990s that relatively modest transfers of national
income had much greater impacts in that country than comparable outlays would
have in the United States.47 But as class inequality has increased in the United
States while declining in Brazil, and as class-based barriers to social mobility in
this country have become increasingly visible, the two countries seem to face a
number of surprisingly (in light of their very different levels of economic develop-
ment) comparable challenges. American workers and their families are in great
need of precisely the forms of support at the heart of Brazil’s social programs:
access to health care and education of acceptable (or better) quality, and an
adequate federally-guaranteed minimum wage.48 And Brazil’s decision to
combine class- and race-based affirmative action in university admissions should
be of great interest to a country—the United States—in which students from
poor and working-class families are severely disadvantaged in their pursuit of
higher education.49 For all these reasons, American citizens and policymakers
could profit from paying close attention to the evolving course of Brazilian social
and racial democracy during this current decade and beyond.
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